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Earnings Management by Non-Profit Organisations: Evidence from UK Charities 
 
Summary at a glance (50 words) 
This study aims to investigate whether UK charities are engaged in earnings management. We 
found that UK charities use discretionary accruals to drive their financial results toward a zero 
level and there is an association between leverage and earnings management practice. 
Furthermore, earnings management is influenced by the organisational size.   
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Abstract 
Informed by stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory, this paper investigates 
whether United Kingdom (UK) charities are engaged in earnings management practices. Based 
on a sample of 1414 charities over a five-year period (2008–2012) this study firstly finds that 
UK charities use discretionary accruals to drive their financial results toward a zero 
surplus/deficit; this result also reveals that the distribution of reported earnings around zero is 
prevalent amongst UK charities. In addition, in contrast to prior findings, the empirical results 
point to a significant association between leverage and earnings management behaviour by 
charities. Lastly, this study also finds that the practice of earnings management is influenced by 
non-profit organizational size. 
Keywords: Earnings management; non-profit organisations; charities; leverage; stakeholder 
theory; resource dependence theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management remains one of the crucial research areas of accounting practice. 
Much of the work has analysed the extent of earnings management, techniques used to manage 
earnings, motivations for managing earnings, and the consequences of earnings management, 
as well as policy recommendations aimed at curbing earnings management activities in the for-
profit sector (Schipper, 1989; Jones, 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006; Shubita, 2012; Walker, 2013; Miloud, 
2014). However, there has been relatively less scrutiny in the case of non-profit organizations 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 
2013). Consequently, this paper focuses on the financial accounting practices of non-profit 
organizations (NPOs) in the UK, with specific attention to the practice of earnings management. 
Admittedly, a limited number of empirical studies has already found evidence of 
earnings management (also financial disclosure management and/or accounting manipulation) 
in non-profit settings (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; Ballantine et al., 
2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013; Boterenbrood, 2014; Vermeer et al., 
2014). In the specific case of the UK, a research gap exists since there has been no 
comprehensive study of earnings management in UK charities1, and the closest relevant study 
(Ballantine et al. (2007) focused only on quasi-public bodies (English NHS Trusts). As in the 
case of several EM studies in other countries (Yetman, 2001; Leone and Van Horn, 2005), the 
focus has remained on idiosyncratic settings (such as hospitals) rather than on the broader 
constituency of larger NPOs that have adopted accruals-based accounting conventions. The 
case of the UK is of particular relevance in terms of its extensive attempts in developing and 
implementing a robust regulatory framework and a common set of accounting practices, 
typified by the numerous iterations of the Statement of Recommended Practice (Charity 
Commission, 2005), resulting from concerns about accountability, transparency and confidence 
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in the activities of the charitable sector (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010). While Verbruggen 
and Christiaens (2012)’s study explored the data of Belgian non-profits that are highly 
subsidized by the government and their research had a limitation in terms of testing the earnings 
management differences among specific sectors of Belgian NPOs, this study focuses on UK 
charities which generate different sources of funding from private donors and from commercial 
activities. In addition, this paper uses a large dataset covering numerous charitable sectors. Our 
study is also motivated by reports from the UK Charity Commission (2013a, 2014) stating that 
there were more than 3,000 compliance cases over a period of two years; of which accounting 
issues were one of the most common problems dealt with by the regulator, for example, some 
charities2 were accused of providing misleading financial information. This leads to our main 
research questions: Do UK charities engage in earnings management practices?  
From a theoretical standpoint, prior NPO-related studies have generally applied agency 
theory (Krishnan et al. 2006, Jegers 2010, Jegers 2013) to examine the extent of earnings 
management practices in such settings. This suggests that earnings management is encouraged 
by self-interested agents. However, this paper argues that broader motivations are at play in 
terms of the role accounting information plays in delivering accountability, transparency, 
reputation and confidence to a wide array of stakeholders. Furthermore, NPOs’ access to funds 
in the form of voluntary income, charitable income and non-financial resources (e.g. donations 
in kind, volunteer labour) is notoriously volatile, implying continuous and significant efforts in 
managing external relationships and dependencies (Connolly and Hyndman 2013). In this 
regard, stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory are adopted as the framework 
underpinning the likely motivation and determinants of earnings management by charities. 
Empirically, this study relies on data from 1414 charities selected on a stratified basis in relation 
to size (total income) and classified in eleven subsectors of activities (based on the International 
Classification of Non-Profit Organisation) over a five-year period (2008-2012). The results 
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firstly suggest that UK charities use discretionary accruals in order to drive their financial 
results toward a zero surplus/deficit. This result is consistent with the frequency distribution of 
reported earnings, which shows that a number of charities with negative unmanaged deficits 
have reported little surpluses after applying discretionary accruals. Secondly, the empirical 
results reveal a negative association between leverage and earnings management behaviour. 
Thirdly, the results show that organizational size has an influence on earnings management 
practice, whereby larger organizations are less likely to be involved in earnings management 
practice. This paper also studies the impact of alternative types of resources (different source 
of income) on earnings management practice but the results are not significant.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides evidence from 
a large and diverse UK sample that charities appear to apply discretionary accruals to manage 
their accounting results. Although there is no specific requirement to achieve a break-even 
position, charities are likely to complete the year with a little surplus (the difference between 
total income and total expenses). This finding is important because potential donors and funders 
partly rely on accounting information to underpin their decision to provide financial and non-
financial support to charities. Relatedly, central government and local authorities may be led 
into misallocating their service contracts to charities due a reliance on accounting information 
to gauge the sustainability of the service provider. In addition, the finding is important for the 
main UK charity regulator (Charity Commission) in the monitoring of charities and to enhance 
their public accountability. Second, whilst the academic and practitioner literature (for example, 
Connolly and Hyndman (2001), Hyndman and McMahon (2010) has debated extensively on 
the development and implementation of appropriate accounting standards in the UK charitable 
sector (the Statement of Recommend Practice) with a view to improving accountability, 
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, our findings have an important implication for 
policy in that the introduction of accruals-based accounting regulation, as in the case of private 
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sector settings, does provide the opportunity for discretionary accruals. Finally, the paper also 
contributes to the theoretical perspective on earnings management practices by considering the 
relevance of stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory to underpin the study of the 
factors underlying the extent of such practices by non-profit organisations (Van Puyvelde et al., 
2012). 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the institutional setting and 
the literature on earnings management in NPOs, followed by the theoretical framework and 
hypotheses in Section 3. The data and models used to measure earnings management are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes and analyses the empirical results and Section 6 
concludes the paper with a discussion of the findings, implications, limitations and propositions 
for further work on earnings management practices by NPOs.  
2. Institutional settings and review of prior literature 
a. UK charity settings and regulatory framework 
By June 2017 there were over 166,000 registered charities in the England and Wales with a 
total annual income of approximately £74 billion3. In 2015, the sector contributed about £12.2 
billion in terms of gross value added, equivalent to almost 0.9% of the gross value added of all 
industries in the UK and employed about 800,000 people (2.7% of the total UK workforce)4.  
The regulatory framework for charity accounting and reporting regulation in the UK has 
experienced significant development, notably since the study by Bird and Morgan-Jones (1981) 
who found extensive accounting inconsistencies and unclear policies by charities. Consequently, 
a number of Statements of Recommended Practice5 have been published and revised in 1988, 
1995, 2000 (Connolly and Hyndman, 2001), 2005 and more recently in 2014, and supplements 
the accounting and reporting requirements of the Charities Act (1960, 1993, 2006, and 2011). 
As stated by the Charity Commission (2014), the Statements of Recommended Practice aims 
to improve the quality of financial reporting by charities and increase the transparency of 
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information about the charity’s financial performance and financial position, for the benefit of 
a wide range of stakeholders. One of the major developments has been the adoption of accruals-
based accounting, which requires charities to report their income and expenditure on the basis 
of occurred transactions, rather than when charities receive and/or spend cash. According to 
Charity Act 1993 (England and Wales) and Charities and Trustee investment Act 2005 
(Scotland), since February 2005, accruals-based accounting was mandatory for all charitable 
companies and non-company charities with gross income exceeding £100,000 (Charity 
Commission, 2005). However, the application of accrual accounting may arguably provide 
reporting organisations with the opportunity to exploit the inherent flexibility of discretionary 
accruals (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013), evidence of which is summarised 
in the following section. 
b. Earnings management by non-profit organisations 
The definition of earnings management in the non-profit sector has not been explicitly defined 
but Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) definition about earnings management is generally cited in NPO 
studies (Ballantine et al. 2007, Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012). These authors support the 
view that earnings management could potentially mislead stakeholders who use financial 
information to assess the organisation’s performance or to make grant decisions. Therefore, the 
terminology of earnings management covers a wider set accounting issues which may affect 
the quality of the financial information. Instead of using earnings management terminology, a 
different term (‘financial disclosure management’) has been used to describe the practice of 
managing accounting figures, either by using accrual accounting or discretion in cost allocation 
practices (Hofmann and McSwain, 2013).    
Several studies in the non-profit context (Khumawala et al., 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; 
Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008; Tinkelman, 2009; Yetman and Yetman, 2013; 
Garven et al., 2016) adopt agency theory-led perspectives to argue that NPO executives may 
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adjust accounting numbers or alter the reporting process with a view to improving the efficiency 
ratio (which is normally measured by the total money spent on charitable activities over total 
income or total expense of NPOs. A higher reported efficiency ratio is generally associated to 
managerial competence, which in turn could improve organisational reputation and lead to 
higher donations (Tinkelman, 1999). In particular, charities were found to make substantial 
changes to programme ratios by using joint cost allocations and misclassifying fundraising 
expenses (Jones and Roberts, 2006; Keating et al., 2008) or reported zero fundraising expenses 
although they undertook fundraising activities (Krishnan et al., 2006) in order to give the 
impression that donor money has been used for worthy causes or to hide potential inefficiencies 
in fundraising activities.  
Furthermore, a number of studies contend that the motivation for NPOs to modify 
reported earnings may arise due to tax avoidance matters or to avoid interference from the 
regulator (political costs). In this respect, cost allocation and cost ‘shifting’ are preferable 
methods that have been used by a number of organisations for misreporting expenditures and 
adjusting earnings in order to re-allocate expenses from their tax-exempt activities to the taxable 
activities with a purpose of reducing tax liabilities (Yetman, 2001; Omer and Yetman, 2003; 
Hofmann, 2007; Omer and Yetman, 2007). NPOs are also found to report small surpluses and 
deficits around zero (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007). They are also 
involved in managing accrual accounting (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013) and 
real earnings management activities (Eldenburg et al., 2011) in order to meet statutory 
obligations and government accounting regulations. 
This review indicates that there is some empirical evidence of NPOs engaged in earnings 
management but the evidence is limited to very few countries or to specific sectors. For instance, 
the ‘zero profit’ acts as a means for NPOs to imply that they have spent all incoming resources 
in order to fulfil their charitable purpose as well as a signal of requiring further resources 
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(Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). However, evidence of this behaviour has not been 
considered for the wider constituency of UK organisations, particularly in the period post-2005 
following the implementation of the updated Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP, 
2005), the development of guidelines for charity financial accountability and governance and 
monitoring activities by the Charity Commission. For larger UK charities (total income in 
excess of £250,000), there is the possibility that some items, such as depreciation or current 
assets, may be open to discretionary practices (Jegers, 2013). A so-called ‘active’ application 
of accrual accounting may result in an upwards or downwards movement in surplus/deficit, 
depending upon managerial or organisational intentions/characteristics but this also has yet to 
be examined in the UK context.  
3. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
a. Theoretical background 
Agency theory has typically been the dominant perspective in the NPO accounting 
literature (Van Puyvelde et al, 2012) but its arguably restrictive assumptions about the agent’s 
characteristics such as self-interest, bounded rationality and risk aversion are not always 
applicable to NPOs. Furthermore, it is often difficult to clearly identify the ultimate owner(s) 
and agent (Jegers, 2013; Newton, 2015) since some NPOs do not have a ‘membership’ base 
(akin to shareholders). In effect, the ‘principal-agent relationship’ in the NPO sector is 
potentially more eclectic than in the corporate sector and actors may have a varied set of 
motivations and behaviours underlying organisational choice and policies (including the use of 
accounting discretion). 
Consequently, we draw from stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory to 
conceptualise the different behaviours and motivations underlying the use (and production) of 
financial accounting information by NPOs. A stakeholder of an organisation is defined by 
Freeman (2010) as anyone who can affect or is affected by the organisation. This suggests that 
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all groups or individuals who belong to NPOs and outsiders, with inter-relationships to the 
organisation can be considered as stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, banks, 
regulators, volunteers and beneficiaries. These stakeholders do have a direct effect on/from the 
organisation. To classify alternative group of stakeholders, Mitchell et al. (1997) for example 
proposed three stakeholder attributes: (1) the power to influence the firm, (2) the legitimacy of 
relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of claim on the firm. Depending on one, two or 
three attributes, the organisation identifies who is the salient stakeholder and seeks to satisfy 
the expectations of the key stakeholder(s) at this particular point of time. This suggests a rather 
flexible approach by organisations whereby accounting discretion or policies may be adopted 
to respond to a salient stakeholder. 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), stakeholder theory encompasses three 
different viewpoints, namely descriptive/empirical, instrumental, and normative. The 
instrumental stakeholder theory is relied upon to identify the links between stakeholder 
management and the achievement of organisational objectives. The instrumental stakeholder 
theory is supported by many authors (Hillman and Keim 2001, Kaler 2003) in a situation when 
attention to a specific stakeholder can impact on the achievement of organisation’s goals. This 
theory could this be applied to explain earnings management practice in the non-profit sector, 
where NPOs operate in tandem with different stakeholders (such as donors, regulators, 
government, volunteers, beneficiaries), to meet stakeholder expectations, including the need to 
comply with legitimate regulations (Connolly et al. 2013). Since a number of stakeholders 
engage with NPOs for different interests, management might intentionally manage accounting 
policies and accounting figures in order to satisfy the expectations of these specific stakeholders.  
For example, Tinkelman (1999) suggested that donors might be interested in the 
efficiency performance of NPOs since a high efficiency ratio (which might be measured by 
programme ratio or fundraising expense ratio, how much money have been spent on charitable 
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activities in compare with money spent on fundraising (admin) activities) may signal that 
donated funds have been used appropriately; consequently, more money has been spent on 
charitable activities, thereby leading to more donations. In a similar vein, governments or 
regulators may be interested in the NPOs level of compliance  as a result of increased political 
scrutiny and accountability towards the taxpayer (Ballantine et al. 2007). The compliance of 
NPOs might be demonstrated through a commitment with charitable and not for profit 
objectives and missions, where charities and NPOs ensure their funds and grants reach the 
relevant beneficiaries. Beattie and Jetty (2009) also contend that charities appear to prioritize 
some stakeholders (e.g. donors, regulators) when preparing financial reports, because these 
stakeholders have power, legitimacy and urgent claims on charities. An emphasis on salient 
stakeholders can also imply a relationship between those who can offer resources to 
organisations that are financially vulnerable or susceptible to an uncertain environment.   
In addition, in line with resource dependence theory, organisations respond in specific 
ways when confronted to the demands of interest groups upon which the organisations depend 
for resources and support in order to reduce environmental uncertainty and dependence (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). NPOs are not an exception because they operate in such a closed 
relationship and ‘are dependent upon continuing exchanges with the environments in which 
they operate’ (Heimovics and Herman 1993: 425). NPOs are not isolated from their 
environment, and their operation is largely dependent upon the flow of resources from outside 
(Heimovics and Herman 1993). Due to increasing competition within the non-profit sector, 
coupled with a decline in funding and fundraising, the negative consequences of this context 
may lead to changes in organisational mission, culture, structures and routines (Dolnicar et al., 
2008). According to the NCVO6 (2012), UK charities lost over £1.3 billion in income from 
government as spending cuts (around 8.8%) materialized during financial year 2011/2012. This 
spending cut has severely impacted on charity operations whilst the demand for public service 
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continues to grow, whereby ‘many charities face the very real challenge of having to do more 
with less, and in some cases nothing’ (NCVO, 2012, p. 4). This requires charities to secure 
other type of resources to retain their operations. To cope with those challenges and to target 
the inflow funds for operations, charity executives may over- or understate accounting figures 
in order to influence users of financial reports (Tinkelman, 1999; Buchheit and Parsons, 2006). 
In addition, Carpenter and Feroz (2001) suggest that organisations choose certain accounting 
practices not merely because these practices applications might be the rational way to account 
for the use of funds, but also because those methods are a socially accepted and legitimate way 
to account for the use of resources. As an illustration, Verbruggen et al. (2011) contends that 
NPOs increase their compliance to accounting regulation in cases where they rely more on 
governmental resources and financial loans; with a view to safeguarding the flow of resources 
from government.  
The probability of involving in managing accounting figures in order to secure the 
resources can be associated to the flexibility of accounting practices, or can also arise due to 
the ambiguity in the treatment of accounting items (e.g. accrual accounting or joint-cost 
allocation). In many cases, it also appears that donors do not pay attention to detailed items 
disclosed in financial statements (Khumawala et al., 2005). Therefore, trustees and managers 
may be motivated in seeking a favourable bottom-line by engaging in earnings management. 
b. Hypothesis development 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, many UK charities have been facing 
funding gaps following the government’s decision to reduce public sector spending whilst 
having to deal with an increasing demand for their services (National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations, 2012). Moreover, many charities have been affected by the global economic 
recession as a result of the fall in individual donations by nearly £1 billion between 2008 and 
2009, while the demand for services increased by over 17%. More than eight out of ten charities 
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believe their sector is facing a crisis, and 40% of charities fear they will close down unless there 
is an economic improvement7. It suggested that charities have faced or are facing significant 
difficulties with an almost concurrent decline in their two main income resources (donations 
and governmental grants/contracts). Therefore, in line with the implications of stakeholder 
theory and resource dependence theory, this context can lead to increased pressures upon 
charity trustees and managers to avoid or lessen the uncertainties induced by the shortage of 
resources while still attempting to fulfil the charitable services expected by society and 
stakeholders. This may require charities to perform more effectively or demonstrate more 
convincingly that their performance is sufficient to satisfy the requirements from different 
stakeholders. Informed by findings from previous studies (Yetman, 2001; Leone and Van Horn, 
2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; 
Jegers, 2013) and the theoretical framework, this study formulates three specific accounting-
led hypotheses to investigate the extent to which UK charities are involved in earnings 
management.  
First, if charities conclude the financial year with a large surplus, this is consequently 
transferred to an accumulated fund and brought forward to subsequent years as required by 
SORP 2005. This might negatively impact on the level of donations and the amount of 
fundraising in subsequent years as stakeholders realise that those charities do not need further 
support (Beattie and Jetty, 2009). Conversely, the reporting of a large deficit may impact on the 
going concern status of charities because incoming resources are not enough to cover resources 
expended, and trustees may experience difficulties in retaining the level of existing operations. 
This may in turn have an impact on the profile and reputation of the trustees, leading in some 
cases to the termination of executive contracts (Leone and Van Horn, 2005). Therefore, the 
instrumental variant of stakeholder theory suggests that charities are motivated to report 
accounting information that may be interpreted in a favourable light by key stakeholders, such 
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as the zero earnings level benchmark required by legal regulators and sponsors (Ballantine et 
al., 2007). In a similar vein, resource dependence theory posits that the charities may be engaged 
in such practices to address uncertainties about future support and pre-empt a reduction in future 
income. Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Reported earnings8 of UK charities (surpluses/deficits) are narrowly distributed 
around zero. 
A zero-bottom line may seem to be a desirable operational position for many NPOs, 
since this figure may reflect that charities have utilised all their donated funds and grants 
provided by stakeholders. From a statutory perspective, charities are restricted from distributing 
surpluses to their ‘owners’ (members or trustees); rather, they exist for the aim of charitable 
purposes (Charities Act, 2011). They are expected to execute charitable projects on the basis of 
their available resources. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no statutory 
requirement for UK charities to achieve a break-even, except for a regulation applicable to 
English NHS Hospital Trusts (Ballantine et al., 2007). Similar cases have been explored in a 
non-profit context (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and 
Christiaens, 2012) and in the public sector (Ferreira et al., 2013). On the one hand, charities 
may in practice face pressures to achieve an ‘ideal break-even’, because if organisations operate 
under severe resource deficits, this not only obstructs their ability to maintain ongoing 
operations for the future, but also brings the risk of being forced to close down (Dodd, 2014). 
On the other hand, charities with excessive surpluses might be reconsidered by stakeholders in 
term of financial support, managerial performance evaluation and regulatory intervention 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005). Previous studies (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 
2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012) found that NPOs intentionally manage their bottom 
line toward zero in order to achieve a target or implicitly signal their capability in financial 
management. The missions of NPOs and charities are not changed by time as they principally 
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aim to achieve their charitable missions and objectives. However, due to an increasing pressure 
from various stakeholders (regulator, donors, government and beneficiaries), NPOs and 
charities may be motivated to take advantage of accrual accounting to manage the bottom line 
(earnings) upwards or downwards in order to achieve the zero-profit level. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: UK charities manage earnings toward zero. 
Numerous studies in the for-profit sector suggest that leverage (and the covenants 
underlying debt obligations) is one of the main reasons leading businesses to be involved in 
earnings management (Jaggi and Picheng, 2002; Saleh and Ahmed, 2005) - due to the financial 
and reputational costs of debt defaults or due to the opportunity to enhance service/activities to 
minimise negative perceptions of the organisation. Recently, Vermeer et al. (2014) found that 
US non-profits with high financial leverage appear to manage actuarial assumptions in order to 
reduce reported liabilities and expenses. Yet, results from recent studies have not been 
consistent and/or significant in order to be able draw conclusions about a leverage effect 
(Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013).  
In terms of the UK charity context, James (2014) reported that more than one in eight 
of the UK’s largest charities have negative working capital (current liabilities exceeding current 
assets). In such circumstances the Charity Commission requires charities to provide an 
explanation in their annual reports, along with likely solutions to address the situation. These 
charities may also be investigated by the Charity Commission. In the worst cases, charities 
might be forced to liquidate or close down because of their inability to cover their liabilities. 
This contextual factor implies that charities with a higher level of liabilities will therefore face 
a higher burden of regulatory scrutiny. Consistent with resource dependence theory and 
stakeholder theory, charities may aim to deflect any regulatory intervention and preserve their 
positive image with funders and other resource providers. Executives and managers may 
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consequently be keen to adjust or intentionally manage accounting figures (the reported 
surplus/deficits) in order to meet fund provider expectations. Alternatively, a high proportion 
of debts may be interpreted another way, in that UK charities are in a difficult period in terms 
of fundraising. In many cases charities use debt and credit facilities to support their operation 
due to the lack of sufficient income and reserves. Consequently, it is plausible that charities 
with higher indebtedness may seek to improve the charity’s public performance (Boterenbrood, 
2014). According to Boateng et al., (2016), the public performance could be considered by 
financial performance (programme spending ratio, fundraising expenses) or non-financial 
performance (quality of service, customer satisfaction). In light of these different reasons and 
the limited empirical evidence, this study formulates the third hypothesis that:  
Hypothesis 3: Charity leverage is significantly associated with the extent of earnings 
management. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the extent to which an organisation depends 
on others can be determined by the significance and concentration of resources provided. The 
fewer sources of income or the greater the dominance of few funders, the more organisations 
become highly dependent on, and are beholden to those providers for survival (Froelich, 1999). 
In a similar vein, in the UK charity context, charity operations are significantly dependent on 
several sources of income, such as income from charitable activities (called as charitable 
income), consisting of grants from central and local government for delivering public services, 
fee-charge from charitable services, and voluntary income comprising incoming resources 
generated from gifts, donations, legacies provided by the founders, patrons, supporters, the 
general public and business as well as grants from government and membership subscriptions, 
sponsorships with donation substance. Voluntary income is normally given for free from donors, 
supporters and grant-makers with the purpose of enhancing charitable activities performed by 
charities9. However, whether such dependence affects financial reporting behaviour, as per 
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resource dependence theory, has not been extensively studied. For instance, Verbruggen and 
Christiaens (2012) analysed the influence of donations and governmental subsidies on earnings 
management practices and found no significant effect for funds donated from individuals and 
organisations, whilst grants from government were negatively associated to earnings 
management practice (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). However, this relationship remains 
debatable because Jegers (2013) then found no significant impact of government subsidies on 
earnings management. Lastly, UK charities comprise of a number of charitable sectors, such as 
education, healthcare, environment and religion, which have different features and stakeholders, 
with specific levels of influence and pressure. This might consequently impact on managerial 
behaviour in relation to earnings management. In order to evaluate the impact of sectoral 
differences on earnings management practice, this study considers the inclusion of control 
variables to explore any sectoral impact, which is discussed further at model and variables 
section.     
4. Research methodology 
a. Model and variables 
This study relies on secondary data extracted from a database managed by the UK 
Charity Commission10. The database comprises all the financial information (the balance sheets 
and statement of financial activities) of more than 9,000 UK charities for a six-year period from 
2007 to 2012 (with minimum income of £500,000). In average, the annual income of these 
charities accounted for nearly 90% of the annual income of all UK charities. The selection of 
this specific period of time also allowed for a consideration of the impact (if any) of the global 
financial crisis on NPOs’ accounting practice. 
A multivariate regression was applied to examine the relationship between earnings 
management and influencing factors, such as break-even target, significance of funding sources, 
leverage level, and the types of charitable activities. In order to test for the possible existence 
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of earnings management practice, discretionary accruals was considered as a proxy for earnings 
management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). According 
to these authors, discretionary accruals represents managerial interventions in financial 
reporting policies in order to change the reported financial results. Discretionary accruals is 
therefore used to examine the earnings management phenomenon by UK charities. 
To test for the first hypothesis, an earnings frequency distribution was carried out to 
examine the phenomenon of reported earnings. The distribution of earnings is then analysed to 
identify the practice of earnings management. The presence of earnings management is 
indicated by an abnormal distribution of reported earnings close to zero (Leone and Van Horn, 
2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). The frequency distribution is 
carried out alongside a comparison of pre-managed earnings (earnings without discretionary 
accruals) and reported earnings, in line with the procedures by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
as explained below.  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) analysed the histograms of the scaled earnings change 
variable with histogram interval widths of 0.0025 for the range -0.15 to +0.15. A bell-shaped 
distribution with an irregularity near zero, with the distribution of slightly positive reported 
earnings beyond normal expectations while small losses are abnormally low relative to adjacent 
regions of distribution, tends to indicate the practice of earnings management (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Indjejikian et al., 2014). In addition, in the context of non-profit organizations, 
Leone and Van Horn (2005) also plotted histograms to identify an abnormal distribution of US 
hospital earnings positively around zero. Reported earnings are determined as the difference 
between total resource income and total resource expended. However, since UK charities are 
varied in terms of income and asset magnitude, the earnings ratio (earnings divided by total 
assets) will be used to mitigate for the differences in NPO size. 
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The Jones (1991) model was used to estimate discretionary accruals (DA), which are 
residuals from the following model (model 1). This model has been used extensively in for-
profit and the non-profit sectors (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell 
et al., 2000; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Atieh and Hussain, 2012; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 
2012). 
ACit/TAit-1 = a*1/TAit-1 +b1*REVit/TAit-1 + b2*PPEit/TAit-1 + e  (1)  
Where, ACit is charity i’s total accruals calculated by the change in non-cash current assets 
minus the change in current liabilities from year t-1 to year t, minus depreciation expense for 
year t (ACit = [Current asset - Cash] -   [Current liability] - Depreciation & Amortization 
expenses).  
REVit is the change in total income resources from year t-1 to year t by charity i.  
PPEit is gross depreciable assets in year t of charity i.  
TAit-1 is total asset year t-1 [determined by total non-current asset + (plus) total current assets]. 
Admittedly, there are several other models to estimate discretionary accruals such as the 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995), the Dechow and Dichev approach (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002) or the Francis model (Francis et al. 2005). However, cash flow information is not 
compulsory for charities to disclose and the accounts receivable item appears to be insignificant 
in the financial statements of UK NPOs. This suggested that the application of those models 
may not generate more reliable results compared to the Jones (1991) model. Furthermore, the 
Jones (1991) model has been applied by Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Verbruggen and 
Christiaens (2012) in the non-profit context as well as in the corporate sector (Peasnell et al. 
2000, Atieh and Hussain 2012). Furthermore, following Leone and Van Horn (2005), this study 
adopts the Jones (1991) model in the non-profit context, where the existence of accruals in 
relation to revenue and depreciation might be construed as a strategy by large NPOs (whose 
total income exceeds £250,000) to manage the bottom line (Charity Commission, 2005). 
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To test hypotheses 2 and 3, this paper uses the following model (model 2) which was 
developed from Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012).  
DAit = a0 + a1EBDAit + a2EARNINGSi t-1 + a3DAit-1 + a4 LEVit + a5SEC_factor + 
a6CHAR_INCit + a7VOL_INCit + + a8Sizeit + e    (2) 
 
Whereby: DA is discretionary accruals; EBDA is earnings before discretionary accrual; 
EARNINGS is net income of previous year; LEV is leverage determined by total short-term and 
long-term liabilities divided by previous year total assets; SEC factor is a dummy variable 
presenting sectoral factors; CHAR_INC is a ratio of charitable income over total income; 
VOL_INC is a ratio of voluntary income over total income; and Size is natural logarithm of total 
assets of charity.  
The purpose of this model is to inspect the impact of several factors on earnings 
management practice, and these factors include the results for the current year (earnings before 
discretionary accruals), the level of credit and borrowings (leverage). This paper also considers 
several control variables, including the significance of the two main sources of income, charity 
size and the different sectors of non-profit activity. The relationship between these factors and 
discretionary accruals seeks to proxy for the motivations with regards to earnings management 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012).  
b. Data and sampling 
The data for this paper is directly sourced from the Charity Commission since charities 
have to file their accounts with the regulator11. The database provided by the Charity 
Commission covers approximately 84% of charity total income in England & Wales, and we 
focus on financial information presented on the statement of financial activities and the balance 
sheet for the period 2008-2012. The sampling approach was based on the following: (i) all 
charities with income greater than £10m (835 charities); and (ii) 10% of charities with income 
from £0.5m to £10 m (579 charities) randomly identified on the basis of a 95 percent confidence 
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level (Saunders et al., 2012); This resulted in a final figure of 1,414 charities or 7,070 
observations on a panel data basis. The combined income of the selected sample represents 
about 55% of the reported income of all charities in England and Wales for 2012. 
The reason for selecting charities by size is supported by previous work suggesting that 
larger firms are more likely to be involved in earnings management (Barton and Simko, 2002; 
Nelson et al., 2002) because of their higher levels of accounting sophistication and greater 
bargaining power. In the context of non-profit organisations, Jegers (2013) suggests that 
organisational size and level of earnings manipulation are positively associated. In addition, 
although only 10% of smaller charities are selected, the observations account for 38% of the 
total selected sample. Finally, charities are classified into 11 sectors based on the International 
Classification of Non-Profit Organisations, which was designed by the US Centre for Civil 
Society Studies at Johns Hopkins University and has been adopted by the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations for UK charity classification.  
5. Empirical results and analysis 
a. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the five-year pooled data from 2008 to 2012 are 
summarized in table 1. The mean total assets and mean total income of the charities were 
£57.032 million and £20.719 million respectively. It is notable that mean leverage accounted 
for nearly 30%, while charitable and voluntary income were on average the two main sources 
of income for UK charities, accounting respectively for approximately 58% and 26% of total 
income. This reflects the significant dependence on, and financial support from, a range of 
external stakeholders (sponsors, donors and creditors). The dependence on these two main 
sources of income was generally stable over the period from 2008 to 2012. The charity sector 
does not seen to have been affected by the global financial crisis. Furthermore, the results 
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showed a mean surplus for 2008 to 2012, while the mean percentage of earnings over total 
assets was approximately 2%.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the descriptive statistics by sector. There is a notable 
variation in relation to total assets and total income among those groups, representing a 
difference in size amongst selected organizations and sectors. Particularly, group 7 (Law, 
Advocacy and Politics) is the smallest sector with the lowest mean of total assets (£8.3million) 
and smallest mean of total income (£10million), while group 8 (Philanthropic Intermediaries 
and Voluntarism Promotion) is the largest sector with the mean of total assets (£191million) 
(approximately 34 times that of group 7). Charities involved in international activities (group 9 
- International) have the highest mean income, of which voluntary income is a significant source 
(accounting for more than 63%). Theoretically, in accordance with stakeholder theory and 
resource dependence theory, organisations may behave differently when there is a change in 
external environments related to disparities among stakeholders and variance of expectations. 
Therefore, it is noted that there are considerable differences in terms of the asset size, income 
and the main components of income between the different charitable sectors - which might in 
turn have an effect on EM practices within particular sectors. 
[Table 2 about here] 
b. Hypothesis 1- Earnings distribution analysis 
This paper first analyses the earnings frequency distribution by plotting histograms of 
reported earnings (which have been scaled by total assets to eliminate the variance in charity 
size). To make these comparable to pre-managed earnings, which are calculated by deducting 
discretionary accruals from reported earnings, the data for the distributional analysis is 
conducted for four years from 2009 to 2012. Consistent with the Jones (1991) model of using 
lagged total assets to determine discretionary accrual, our variables of reported earnings and 
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pre-managed earnings also use lagged total assets. This leads to a reduction of one year data 
(from five years to four years). However, the number of observations (5,656) remains sufficient 
to understand the reported earnings behaviour of UK charities (Jobome, 2006). 
The reported earnings frequency distribution of 5,656 charity-years from 2009 to 2012, 
before and after applying discretionary accruals is illustrated in figure 1. Overall, the result 
shows that reported earnings have a slight positive mean value of 0.0526. In particular, there 
are more than 3,500 observations reporting small surpluses (around 0.18), while there are 
slightly fewer than 2,000 observations with very small deficits (approximately -0.22). The 
results are consistent with Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Jegers (2013) in that large numbers 
of non-profits with earnings are distributed around zero (e.g. the mean of US hospital operating 
income and Belgian NPO earnings were 2.4% and 2.6% respectively), and more of the reported 
earnings are on the positive side than on the negative side. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Alongside a frequency distribution analysis (figure 1), we also conduct another 
frequency distribution analysis of reported earnings of UK charities in the period from 2008-
2012. Our study first shows that about 39% of charities reported earnings between -£250,000 
and £250,000 in the period. This interval is similar to the figure of charities’ reported earnings 
(divided by total assets) i.e. between -2.5% to 2.5%. In this study, we consider an interval of 
reported earnings between -£250,000 and £250,000 as close to zero. The rationale of this 
assumption is initiated by the findings from prior studies as Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) 
found that Belgian NPOs’ earnings (mean value) were found to be reported around 2.4% while 
US hospital earnings (mean value) were around 2.6% (Leone and Van Horn, 2005). 
A comparison between the frequency distributions of post-managed and pre-managed 
earnings reveals that the means are not significantly different (at the 5% level). However, the 
number of observations with deficits is lower than the number of those with pre-managed 
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figures (approximately 1,800 vs. 2,300), and the number with reported surpluses is more than 
pre-managed data (around 3,600 vs. 2,800). This may imply that many charities rely on 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward to achieve a slightly positive result. Overall, 
this result supports hypothesis 1, namely that a significant number of UK charities reported 
earnings narrowly around zero. 
The rationality of this reporting behaviour can be explained as small surpluses or deficits 
may create a good image for charities. Particularly, this could express the competence of 
managers and trustees in operating charities, since on the one hand a small surplus means that 
charities have sufficient funds for their activities and to achieve their stated objectives, while 
on the other hand, if the results are slightly negative this suggests that charities have spent their 
budgeted allocations and may be considered to have met the requirements of sponsors and 
donors. Furthermore, the surpluses and deficits will be added to (or reduced from) the charity 
reserves. According to paragraph 55 of Statement of Recommended Practice 2005 (Charity 
Commission, 2005), and Charities and Reserves (CC19) (Charity Commission, 2010), charities 
are required to disclose their reserve policy, as well as consider and explain when they have an 
excess or a shortfall in reserves. Therefore, this may motivate charities to use the reported 
figures to manage their reserve levels to avoid reporting large excesses or shortfalls. A result 
close to zero net income may thus keep reserves at a stable level, and make it easier for charities 
to explain their financial situation compared to unusual increases or decreases in reserves. 
Theoretically, from the perspective of stakeholders who support charities, there is an 
expectation that the financial support given to charities will be directed to beneficiaries (Breeze, 
2010). Therefore, a charity with a large surplus may prompt questions from donors about its 
efficiency, as well as its capability to fully achieve its charitable objectives. This may have a 
negative impact on future resources. Therefore, the managing of surpluses/deficits may be a 
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strategy to mitigate environmental uncertainties and relationships with resource providers and 
to manage stakeholder perceptions more generally. 
c. Hypothesis 2: Earnings management towards zero level 
The summary information from table 1 shows that the charities’ financial results before 
discretionary accruals varied from a -16% deficit to a 31% surplus. Discretionary accruals also 
vary widely from -0.876 to +0.477. This may suggest that a number of charities engage in 
earnings management upwards or downwards in order to achieve their intentional targets. 
However, in order to determine the specific behaviour of charity managers in relation to 
earnings management, an ordinary least squares regression is implemented. Before the 
regression was conducted, the regression diagnostics and Pearson correlation matrix were 
applied to identify issues of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity (Chen 
and Zhang, 2014)8. The results show a high correlation between voluntary income (VOL_INC) 
and charitable income (CHAR_INC) (-0.798), because they represent the two main components 
of charity income. To ensure that multicollinearity will not impact on the multivariate analysis, 
an additional test using variance inflation factors was conducted to assess whether 
multicollinearity was a matter of concern (Vu, 2008; Chen and Zhang, 2014). The result of the 
variance inflation factors test indicated that multicollinearity was not a problem since the 
maximum value of variance inflation factors was 2.97 (Kennedy, 2003; Reheul et al., 2013). 
In addition, an omitted variable test was also performed to determine whether there was 
any excluded variable which might impact on the accuracy of the regression model. Ramsey’s 
regression specification error test was used to implement this test (Vu, 2008), and the result 
indicated that the model may have omitted variables which could impact on the accuracy of the 
regression results. Consequently, this paper used panel data regression with fixed effect to 
eliminate the impact of omitted variables (Hsiao, 2006). The results of the regression analysis 
for the 4242 observations are shown in table 3. To identify the relationship between pre-
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managed earnings and discretionary accruals, an additional regression was performed for the 
two categories of negative and positive pre-managed earnings. The division of two pre-
managed earnings groups (positive and negative) can specifically reveal the reaction of charities 
depending on the sign of the financial results (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). 
[Table 3 is about here] 
The relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings before discretionary 
accruals was negative for the whole sample, and also for the case of negative and positive pre-
managed earnings. In accordance with previous findings and conclusions about the negative 
relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings before discretionary accruals (Leone 
and Van Horn, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012), charities appear to pay close attention 
to the disclosure of the financial bottom line. If there is a high likelihood that the financial 
statements will report surpluses (deficits), there appears to be an adjustment of discretionary 
accruals downwards (upwards) to ensure a result that is close to zero. These results support the 
second hypothesis that charities manage earnings upwards when pre-managed earnings are 
negative and downwards when pre-managed earnings are positive. The coefficient for this 
relationship is higher when pre-managed earnings are negative in comparison with positive pre-
managed earnings (-0.89 vs. -0.58), implying that in years with deficit results, charities may 
appear to be slightly more aggressive in applying accruals to manage earnings upwards than in 
years with positive results. 
The results of this paper are consistent with Leone and Van Horn (2005)’s results from 
8,179 observations in US hospitals, which suggested that earnings before discretionary accrual 
are in a negative relation with discretionary accruals, leading the reported earnings (the sum of 
earnings before discretionary accrual and discretionary accruals) to be closed to zero. This 
means that discretionary accruals were applied to adjust earnings towards zero depending on 
the positive or negative pre-managed earnings. These results are also compatible with 
28 
 
Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) in the context of Belgian non-profit organisations. These 
authors also found that Belgian NPOs exercised discretionary accruals to drive the bottom line 
item (earnings) in favour of zero reporting. The coefficients of EBDA (earnings before 
discretionary accruals) are negatively related to discretionary accruals in the case of both 
negative and positive EBDA, and this value is higher in the case of negative EBDA. The 
previous papers found that non-profit organisations are engaged in earnings management by 
managing earnings toward zero, and this finding can thus be extended to the wider constituency 
of UK charities. This may indicate a systemic managerial concern with the bottom-line result 
and the underlying message and image it might convey to external stakeholders, particularly 
sponsors, donors, beneficiaries and regulators. These results chime with instrumental 
stakeholder theory in that it suggests that charities may be behave in a specific manner 
(managing the bottom-line items) in order to satisfy particular stakeholders, such as sponsors, 
donors and regulators. Also, this practice can be explained by motivations to retain resources 
for operation and minimise scrutiny or intervention by regulatory bodies, even in the presence 
of accounting and governance regulation. A more detailed analysis is presented in relation to 
the different sectors in a subsequent section.  
The results from this study appear to be consistent with prior findings indicating that 
NPOs might re-allocate expenditure (Khumawala et al., 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; 
Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008), manage specific expenditure items (for example, 
actuarial assumption and depreciation) (Pellicer et al., 2014), manage discretionary accruals 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012) or even smooth their income 
(Boterenbrood, 2014). Moreover, previous year earnings and past discretionary accruals also 
have an effect on discretionary accruals in the current year.  
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d. Hypothesis 3: Leverage and earnings management 
The statistical analysis in table 3 suggests that leverage has a negative relationship with 
discretionary accruals. The results are significant for both positive and negative unmanaged 
earnings. This implies that charities with an increasing level of leverage consider managing 
earnings downwards in cases of operational surpluses, and when unmanaged earnings are 
negative, charities appear to manage deficits upwards. The reaction of charities in the presence 
of leverage not only supports Hypothesis 3, but also lends credence to the second hypothesis in 
that targeting zero earnings is an intention of charities. Hence, charities again show an aim of 
managing earnings toward zero, but one that is more robust in the presence of higher financial 
obligations. In this respect, Hypothesis 3 is supported.  
In order to test the relationship between leverage and earnings management, another 
analysis was conducted using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the dependent 
variable (Davidson et al., 2005; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Chen and Zhang, 2014). The detailed 
results in table 4 show a significantly positive association between the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and leverage. This indicates that the higher the charity leverage, the more 
it uses discretionary accruals to manage financial performance to a favourable level. This 
finding clarifies the mixed findings from prior studies with regard to the relationship between 
leverage and earnings management (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013), and 
partly supports the US-based finding by Vermeer et al. (2014) that managers of NPOs with 
higher leverage appear to manage income upwards. 
e. Impact of other factors on earnings management  
In order to assess the impact of other factors on earnings management of UK charities, 
this study consider several factors including sectoral differences, different types of funding, 
charity size as well as the impact of the global financial crisis.   
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First, a regression analysis on a sectoral basis was implemented to identify indications 
of different EM behaviour on a sectoral basis, and the results are reported in table 5 below. 
[Table 5 is about here] 
The results reveal that earnings before discretionary accruals are negatively associated 
with discretionary accrual for different sectors. These results are robust for hypotheses 1 and 2 
in that charities prefer to report earnings around zero, and discretionary accruals have been 
applied in order to manage earnings to this favourable level. Moreover, in order to distinguish 
the differences of managing discretionary accruals to adjust reported earnings amongst different 
sectors, an alternative regression (of model 2) using dummy variables representing eleven 
sectors and their interaction with earnings before discretionary accruals is implemented. 
However, the results are not statistically significant and no decisive conclusion can be reached 
on sectoral differences with regard to earnings management. 
In addition, leverage has a negative association with earnings management for all groups 
of charities; the result is consistent with the findings in supporting hypothesis 3 above. In order 
to examine the differences in impact of leverage on earnings management among these groups, 
an additional regression using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as dependent variable 
is conducted. The results suggest that except for group 7 (Law, advocacy and politics) and group 
11 (Business and professional associations, unions), the results showed a significantly positive 
association between leverage and absolute value of discretionary accruals among the other 
groups. This implies that leverage may not be a factor influencing earnings management 
behaviour in all sectors.  
In respect of other control variables, the results from Table 3 indicate that organizational 
size (measured by total assets) is negatively and significantly associated with discretionary 
accruals, and this relationship is similar to the specific case of pre-managed surpluses, but not 
for charities reporting pre-managed deficits. In order to confirm this relationship, an alternative 
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test of the absolute value of discretionary accruals was conducted as suggested by prior studies 
(Davidson et al., 2005; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Chen and Zhang, 2014). The results (in table 
4) show a negative association between size and absolute value of discretionary accruals. This 
result suggests that larger charities are less likely to be involved in earnings management and 
may proxy for the possibility that a higher level of professionalism, reputational awareness and 
governance (e.g. external trustee members) is present in such charities; thereby curbing the 
potential for higher levels of earnings management. 
Finally this study considers how the global financial crisis impacts on earnings 
management by UK charities by splitting the data into two periods, period 1 (2008-2009) and 
period 2 (2010-2012), to explore for any differences in the practice of earnings management by 
UK charities. However, the results did not suggest any significant difference in earnings 
management practice between two periods.  
f. Sensitivity analysis and robustness tests 
In order to ensure the validity of the empirical results determined from the various 
regression models, we conducted several sensitivity analyses and robustness tests, which 
included applying the two-stage least square (2SLS) method to minimise the impact of 
endogeneity, changing the independent variables measuring the source of income, and 
implementing an additional test of specific accrual (depreciation) rather than relying on overall 
discretionary accruals. The 2SLS regression is based on the assumption of a potential 
endogenous relationship between earnings before discretionary accruals and income growth 
and consistently displays that two variables: EBDA and LEV are negatively associated with 
dependent variable: discretionary accruals (table 6). 
In addition, it was suggested by Leone and Van Horn (2005) that there may be a 
mechanical correlation between DA and EBDA from model 2. This study therefore proposes a 
new proxy for EBDA (namely NEW_EBDAit) which is equal to 1 if earnings before the 
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discretionary accrual of charity i in period t scaled by Total Assets in period t-1 is greater than 
zero, and zero otherwise. The results also show a negative association between discretionary 
accruals and NEW_EBDA, as well as a negative relationship between leverage and 
discretionary accruals. While the significance of different income sources shows the same 
results as the main tests, size is not significantly related to EM. Nonetheless, these results once 
again show robust support for the second and third hypotheses. 
Lastly, this study considers the specific case of ‘abnormal depreciation’ as a specific 
accrual to examine whether charities use depreciation as a tool for earnings management. 
Recently, Pellicer et al. (2014) conducted a study in UK public sector bodies and suggested that 
depreciation is the main method by which local government entities manage accounting 
numbers. These findings may be considered in the context of UK charities since depreciation 
is a part of total resources expended. Abnormal depreciation is determined based on the 
assumption that the proportion of depreciation over gross property, plant and equipment is 
constant. In consequence, the over- or under-depreciated amount represents an abnormal 
depreciation. This figure is used to test the relationship between unexpected depreciation and 
earnings before unexpected depreciation; similar to discretionary accrual, the charities may 
over- or under-record depreciation for the purpose of managing earnings downward or upward. 
The results are consistent with and provide support for the main results from model 2. 
Depreciation thus appears to be one of the accounting tools charities use to adjust outgoing 
resources. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper sought to investigate whether UK charities engage in earnings management 
practices, and if so, what are the key organisational determinants influencing the extent of 
earnings management practices. By relying on stakeholder theory and resource dependence 
theory, mainstream measures of earnings management (distribution of reported earnings, 
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discretionary accruals) and a relatively large data set from 1,414 charities over a five-year 
period, this study finds clear evidence that the reported bottom lines of UK charities are: (i) 
distributed narrowly around the zero level, but with an attention to display positive (surplus) 
rather than negative (deficit) results; and (ii) subject to discretionary accrual tactics of an 
upwards or downwards nature in order to manage earnings closer to zero level. Furthermore, 
the extent of discretionary accruals is found to fluctuate on the basis of leverage, organizational 
size and type of activity (sector). This is the first UK study which considers a relatively large 
and diversified sample of charities and as such provides evidence of a systemic behaviour in 
the reporting of the accounting bottom line.  
The findings are consistent with prior research claiming that non-profit organisations 
have various incentives to manage accounting figures by different techniques such as 
misclassifying functional expenditures to improve programme ratio and/or lower fundraising 
costs and lessen administrative expenses (Yetman, 2001; Jones and Roberts, 2006; Krishnan et 
al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008; Tinkelman, 2009; Yetman and Yetman, 2012), using 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings towards the zero level (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; 
Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013). This paper finds that 
a number of UK charities reported small positive earnings (surplus) or little losses around zero 
(hypothesis 1). When the results show a significant surplus or considerable deficits, 
discretionary accrual may be applied in order to direct earnings toward zero (hypothesis 2). 
This level is not a statutory benchmark, but it provides a way for charity trustees to balance 
resources and expenditure as well as demonstrate efficiency in their operations. Moreover, this 
study suggests that leverage has an association with discretionary accruals (hypothesis 3). This 
finding thus posits that charities with a large amount of debt and credit obligations seem to be 
more likely to be involved in EM. This is a significant result in that previous NPO studies did 
not find support for the effect of leverage on EM behaviour. These findings were found to be 
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robust by testing for abnormal depreciation as a specific accrual, considering the use of 
alternative independent variables and relying on the two-stage least square (2SLS) method.  
In spite of their economic importance and valuable findings from an emerging literature, 
little is known about the financial reporting practices of non-profit organisations in the UK. 
This study attributes this to the absence of a comprehensive financial database for UK charities 
compared to the United States for instance. As a result, the findings and analysis of this study 
have key implications. First, stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory provide a very 
useful theoretical framework to understand the wider motivations behind earnings management 
in a non-profit context and to analyse the results thereof. In particular, the combination of an 
instrumental perspective on stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory can substitute 
for agency theory in explaining the varying behaviour of non-profit executives. For example, 
the target reporting of close to zero earnings in UK charities might be motivated by 
consideration of key stakeholders and uncertainties in accessing future resources. Second, while 
the UK context can be characterised as one where the regulatory framework of accounting for 
charities is highly developed (indeed, it has inspired reforms in other countries), the evidence 
reinforces the view that accrual accounting can also offer the potential for discretionary 
behaviour by NPOs. Whilst not a novel insight in itself, this finding will be of interest to the 
Charity Commission, which may help strengthen its monitoring activities by taking into account 
the extent of discretionary accrual practices adopted by charities. Since it carries out a regime 
risk-based inspections, the extent of EM may indirectly highlight concerns about internal 
practices and governance in such an organisation.  
However, there are some limitations in terms of the data relied upon in this paper. There 
is insufficient information on the specific providers of income, which, if available, would have 
allowed for a more rigorous analysis of the impact of different stakeholders and resource 
providers on earnings management behaviour. Also, the empirical results from this study would 
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be more informative if cash flow data could be collected, thereby enabling the use of other 
discretionary accrual metrics and models such as the Modified Jones model, the Dechow and 
Dichev approach or the Francis model. Nonetheless, the results provide sufficient evidence to 
spur the debate on the reliability of SORP-based accounting information in the UK charitable 
context. 
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Endnotes 
1. NPO is a generic term for all third sector organisations which do not distribute profits or surpluses 
for the benefit of members, shareholders or other financial motivated stakeholders. Most NPOs 
typically operate under the constraint of ‘non-dividend distribution’ although that many of them 
generate profits or surpluses. In the UK context, NPOs comprise of two types of organisational 
structures, (i) charities and community groups and (ii) social enterprises. However, in this study, we 
focus on charities as a main player of UK NPOs. (Source: 
https://www.resourcecentre.org.uk/information/legal-structures-for-not-for-profit-organisations/). 
2. For example, in August 2012 a charity named ‘Fund for the Blind and Partially Sighted’ was 
convicted of theft and misleading information to the Commission under the Charities Act, and in 
another case AA Hamilton College Limited, a higher education college, was found to employ poor 
financial controls and unauthorised benefits due to the fact that two trustees were employed as staff 
members (Source: Charity Commission: Annual reports and Account 2012–13, p.11). 
3. http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk 
4. According to ‘What is the sector’s contribution to the economy?’ published by NCVO at 
http://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac14/what-is-the-sectors-contribution-to-the-economy/ 
5. SORP for charity accounting was initially prepared and issued by the Accounting Standard 
Committee (ASC) in 1988 with a ‘Statement of Recommended Practice No 2 (Accounting by 
Charities)’ – SORP 2. 
6. http://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac12/what-impact-did-the-recession-have-upon-the-voluntary-sector/ 
7. http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/dec/09/one-in-six-charities-close 
8. ‘Earnings’ is a general term indicating the operational result of charities, according to SORP 2005, 
defined as ‘Net incoming/outgoing resources before transfers’. It is determined by total incoming 
resources minus total resources expended. 
9. Other sources of charity income include investment income and other incoming resources.  
10. The authors sought permission from the UK Charity Commission to use the database for research 
purposes. This database is now publicly available at http://data.charitycommission.gov.uk/default.aspx  
11. The data collected from the UK Charity Commission with a permission to be used for research 
purpose. 
12. Because of the extreme kurtosis and significant skewness problems, a winsorizing of the two 
variables (EBDAit and EARNINGSit-1) at 5% was performed to resolve these issues. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Items (in GBP) Mean Standard 
deviation 
Perc.25 Median Perc.75 
Total Asset 57,032,080 433,405,636 3,206,022 12,256,266 35,462,014 
Total Liability 14,146,786 82,844,491 388,603 2,213,000 7,005,074 
Leverage 29.64% 29.72% 8.31% 22.10% 42.27% 
Total Income 20,719,039 47,244,579 2,143,567 10,558,425 19,965,408 
Charitable Income 11,979,547 31,966,269 431,490 2,875,614 13,055,562 
Voluntary Income 5,903,279 24,787,801 11,000 324,523 2,685,093 
Earnings (Surplus/Deficits) 546,054 16,562,740 - 54,680 172,649 977,001 
Charitable Income/Total 
Income 
58.10% 40.36% 8.87% 76.08% 96.09% 
Voluntary income/Total 
income 
26.02% 33.92% 0.21% 5.32% 50.17% 
Earnings/Total assets 2.2% 44.16% -0.98% 2.49% 6.84% 
N = 1414 charities (7,070 observations) 
 Variables N Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
DAit 4242 0.000000 0.108505 -0.875694 0.003989 0.477413 
EBDAit 4242 0.036929 0.114020 -0.161457 0.019982 0.310464 
EARNINGSi,t-1 4242 0.037679 0.088504 -0.115804 0.024619 0.264029 
DAi,t-1 4242 0.000000 0.112011 -0.875694 0.006449 0.604326 
LEVit 4242 0.292466 0.286316 0 0.219712 4.443969 
VOL_INCit 4242 0.2614498 0.342187 0 0.051851 1 
CHAR_INCit 4242 0.5841176 0.404393 0 0.761319
9 
1 
Sizeit 4242 16.15339 1.811005 10.58266 16.32477 23.45875 
DAit is the residual from the Jones model (equation 1). EBDAit is earnings before discretionary accruals = 
Earningsit/Total assetsi,,t-1 – Discretionary accruals. EARNINGSi,,t-1 is earnings in year t-1 scaled by lagged 
total assets. DAi,,t-1 is discretionary accruals in year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-term creditor in year 
t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is a proportion of charitable income over total income in year 
t. VOL_INCit is a proportion of voluntary income over total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of 
the total assets of charity i in year t. The data for model 2 is limited to 4242 observations (1414 charities 
across 3 years) as DAit is available for 2010 to 2012 and DAi,t-1 is available for 2009 to 2011 (lagged assets). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics per charity sector (2008 to 2012)  
Items  Statistics Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Group 8 Group 9 Group 10 Group 11 
 N 655 1705 620 1055 320 850 200 450 270 700 245 
Total Asset (£’000) Mean 24,100 76,800 34,200 29,600 41,900 58,000 8,315 191,000 29,500 56,000 26,100 
Std. Deviation 55,100 819,000 80,800 68,200 136,000 116,000 20,700 559,000 68,900 74,900 37,800 
Median 5,674 16,900 8,732 5,695 8,762 16,000 762 20,600 11,100 27,900 13,600 
Total Liability 
(£’000) 
Mean 7,565 16,200 11,400 4,911 5,694 38,600 2,074 27,600 8,997 5,257 6,748 
Std. Deviation 33,200 137,000 45,300 10,500 15,600 81,300 5,411 129,000 30,200 14,300 10,400 
Median 1,537 4,367 967 1,161 910 4,545 217 1,595 2,669 1,593 3,496 
Leverage (%) Mean 37% 32% 20% 27% 22% 50% 29% 22% 30% 13% 31% 
Std. Deviation 31% 22% 20% 25% 28% 45% 19% 26% 24% 17% 43% 
Median 30% 28% 13% 20% 11% 40% 27% 10% 24% 6% 23% 
Total Income (£’000) Mean 17,800 19,100 24,500 21,400 22,500 23,000 10,000 18,900 52,900 12,700 16,600 
Std. Deviation 54,500 39,500 65,900 38,800 55,700 37,400 18,900 49,900 104,000 15,300 18,200 
Median 8,555 11,700 6,215 9,476 4,900 13,100 1,247 6,025 23,200 10,300 11,900 
Charitable Income 
(£’000) 
Mean 6,644 13,200 15,100 13,500 8,111 20,100 6,798 5,343 19,000 3,722 12,200 
Std. Deviation 9,912 22,600 56,600 25,700 30,900 33,800 15,600 33,800 74,300 8,500 15,700 
Median 2,549 10,000 1,601 2,660 805 11,600 895 - 1,174 704 9,390 
Voluntary Income 
(£’000) 
Mean 7,603 3,059 7,238 5,630 10,300 1,291 1,435 7,722 29,800 6,934 324 
Std. Deviation 38,400 20,700 34,400 18,300 22,300 7,691 4,325 32,100 46,600 11,700 851 
Median 546 116 1,025 276 962 2 67 688 11,100 3,055 6 
Earnings 
(Surplus/Deficits) 
(£’000) 
Mean 761 -409 971 637 889 778 425 2,200 845 483 813 
Std. Deviation 4,120 29,600 6,182 4,639 4,191 5,841 1,945 26,200 7,801 5,315 3,055 
Median 56 438 208 80 124 198 31 78 373 67 242 
Charitable 
Income/Total Income 
(%) 
Mean 51.57% 78.67% 47.60% 64.79% 35.39% 81.03% 70.49% 21.88% 27.91% 22.64% 71.20% 
Std. Deviation 32.35% 32.46% 38.69% 38.35% 34.49% 30.13% 37.34% 37.84% 37.24% 29.63% 30.96% 
Median 52.58% 93.96% 37.05% 84.60% 28.05% 95.78% 91.99% 0.00% 2.99% 7.81% 87.25% 
Voluntary 
Income/Total Income 
(%) 
Mean 28.70% 11.91% 31.36% 22.43% 41.07% 8.14% 21.19% 38.58% 63.29% 59.61% 5.27% 
Std. Deviation 29.83% 24.80% 30.24% 30.35% 35.23% 19.91% 32.70% 39.68% 40.04% 32.99% 15.04% 
Median 18.28% 1.18% 24.94% 5.86% 35.86% 0.07% 2.24% 21.36% 85.90% 70.11% 0.17% 
Group: 1. Culture and Recreation; 2. Education and Research; 3. Health; 4. Social Services; 5. Environment; 6. Development and Housing; 7. Law, Advocacy and 
Politics; 8. Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion; 9. International; 10. Religion; 11. Business and professional associations, unions. 
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Table 3: Regression results on entire sample  
Regression 
DA 
  All EBDA Positive EBDA Negative EBDA 
Variables Exp.n Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value 
INTERCEPT 
 
1.01 3.24 1.28 8.55 -0.03 -0.12 
EBDAit - -0.64 -23.63*** -0.58 -20.76*** -0.89 -12.96*** 
EARNINGSi,t-1 
 
-0.16 -5.33*** -0.11 -3.71*** -0.06 -1.59 
DAi,t-1 
 
-0.24 -11.87*** -0.22 -11.49*** -0.15 -7.15*** 
LEVit - -0.25 -4.42*** -0.17 -9.93*** -0.37 -10.22*** 
VOL_INCit - 0.07 2.25*** 0.06 2.36** 0.08 1.98** 
CHAR_INCit - 0.003 0.17 -0.01 -0.68 0.024 0.86 
Size  -0.06 -3.03*** -0.07 -7.05*** 0.006 0.36 
Sector 1  0.0049 0.57     
Sector 2  0.0052 0.66     
Sector 3  -0.0060 -0.69     
Sector 4  -0.0010 -0.12     
Sector 5  -0.0057 -0.58     
Sector 6  0.0083 0.99     
Sector 7  -0.0004 -0.04     
Sector 8  -0.0109 -1.18     
Sector 9  -0.0017 -0.17     
Sector 10  -0.0151 -1.70     
N 
 
4242 
 
2551 
 
1691 
 
R square 
 
0.1312 
 
0.0249 
 
0.0215 
 
F-value   139.46   115.74   46.06   
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
VIF maximum  2.97  2.76  2.73  
***, **: Significance at 1% and 5% level. 
DAit is discretionary accruals in year t. EBDAit is earnings before discretionary accruals. EARNINGSi,t-1 is earnings 
in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets. DAi,t-1 is discretionary accruals in year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-
term creditor in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is proportion of charitable income over total 
income in year t. VOL_INCit is proportion of voluntary income over total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural 
logarithm of total assets of charity i in year t. Sector is a dummy variable. 
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Table 4: Regression results with dependent variable as the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals 
Variables Coef. t 
EBDAit 0.094 8.07** 
EARNINGi,t-1 0.045 2.79** 
DAi,t-1 0.016 1.51 
VOL_INCit -0.010 -0.69 
CHAR_INCit -0.010 -0.8 
LEVit 0.048 4.44** 
Size -0.024 -3.71** 
Constant 0.443 4.27** 
N 4242 
F(7,2821) 19.12 
Prob > F 0.0000 
R square 0.1447 
**, *: Significance at 1% and 5% level. 
Dependent variable is absolute value of discretionary accruals in year t. EBDAit is earnings before discretionary 
accruals. EARNINGSi,t-1 is earnings in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets. DAi,t-1 is discretionary accruals in 
year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-term creditor in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is 
proportion of charitable income over total income in year t. VOL_INCit is proportion of voluntary income over 
total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets of charity i in year t.  
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Table 5: Regression results by sector  
 Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
EBDAit -0.68*** -0.43*** -0.58*** -0.64*** -0.73*** -0.64*** -1.13*** -0.62*** -0.89*** -0.30*** -0.71*** 
EARNINGSi,t-1 -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.11** -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.15 -0.18** -0.34** -0.02 -0.29*** 
DAi,t-1 -0.19*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.24*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.22*** 
LEVit -0.41*** -0.22*** -0.65*** -0.44*** -0.80*** -0.07*** -0.53*** -0.39*** -0.50*** -0.19*** -0.15*** 
VOL_INCit 0.05 0.03 0.18** 0.03 0.19 0.12** 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.06** 0.00 
CHAR_INCit -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Size -0.05 -0.02 -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.21*** -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.23*** -0.02 -0.02 
INTERCEPT 0.96 0.46 2.25 1.42 3.56 0.43 0.31 -0.34 3.91 0.32 0.45 
N 393 1023 372 633 192 510 120 270 162 420 147 
R-square 0.244 0.17 0.04 0.1023 0.0196 0.244 0.616 0.149 0.11 0.34 0.337 
F 66.38 75.47 57.54 68.26 23.66 88.59 43.29 30.70 20.67 27.72 34.79 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
***, **, *: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
DAit is the current year’s discretionary accrual. EBDAit is earnings before discretionary accruals. EARNINGSi,t-1 is earnings in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets. 
DAi,t-1 is discretionary accruals in year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-term creditor in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is the proportion of 
charitable income over total income in year t. VOL_INCit is proportion of voluntary income over total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets of 
charity i in year t. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis results 
Variables  Description 2SLS 
Coef. 
EBDAit Earnings before discretionary accruals -0.238*** 
EARNINGi,t-1 Earnings in year t-1 0.056** 
DAi,t-1 Discretionary accruals in year t-1 -0.167*** 
LEVit Leverage  -0.049*** 
VOL_INCit Proportion of voluntary income  0.007 
CHAR_INCit Proportion of charitable income  0.008 
Size Natural log of total assets of charity i in year t. -0.001 
Intercept  0.024 
F  21.92 
Prob > F  0.0000 
R-square  0.1443 
Significance at 1% level (***) and 5% level (**) 
Dependent variable: DAit: Discretionary accruals 
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Figure 1: Frequency distribution of reported earnings and pre-managed earnings (2009 to 
2012, N = 5656) 
Frequency distribution of reported earnings over lagged total assets 
 
Frequency distribution of pre-managed earnings over lagged total assets 
 
An F-test with null hypothesis was performed to test the differences between means and variances for reported 
earnings and pre-managed earnings. The results show that the means of reported earnings and un-managed 
earnings are not significantly different (p-value > 0.05), but the variances of those values are different at a 
significance level of less than 0.05. 
 
 
 
